

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00394 01 OF 03 231554Z

44

ACTION ACDA-10

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0394

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: ANALYSIS OF EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR FORCE DEFINITIONS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: STARTING ON JUNE 17, THE EAST HAS IN SEVERAL INFORMAL SESSIONS URGED THAT PARTICIPANTS IN THE VIENNA TROOP REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS ATTEMPT TO REACH AN AGREED DEFINITION OF WHAT FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA BELONG TO THE AIR FORCES AND WHICH TO THE GROUND FORCES. GIVEN THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH, SUCH A SEPARATION OF FORCES INTO TWO CATEGORIES APPEARS NOT TO BE NECESSARY. THIS MESSAGE ANALYZES ONE POSSIBLE LINE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS TO WHICH THE EASTERN FORCE DEFINITION PROPOSAL MAY BE POINTING. END SUMMARY.

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SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00394 01 OF 03 231554Z

2. IN MID-APRIL, AT THE END OF THE FIFTH ROUND OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, SEVERAL EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HINTED THAT THE EAST WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS BOTH FORCE DEFINITIONS AND DATA DURING THE FORTHCOMING ROUND (MBFR VIENNA 0196). WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED IN MID-MAY, SOVIET MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE KAPITONOV CONTINUED TO HINT THAT THE EAST MIGHT BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS FORCE DEFINITIONS AND THEN DATA (MBFR VIENNA A-71). BUT IN MORE OFFICIAL EASTERN STATEMENTS IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS, SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE KHLESTOV AND OTHER EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES CONTINUED UNEQUIVOCALLY TO REJECT DATA DISCUSSION. DESPITE THIS, KAPITONOV CONTINUED TO HINT THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS BOTH DEFINITIONS AND DATA (MBFR VIENNA A-88).

3. THE EAST MADE NO OFFICIAL MOVE AS REGARDS THIS TOPIC UNTIL THE INFORMAL SESSION OF JUNE 17, WHEN KHLESTOV PROPOSED THAT PARTICIPANTS WORK TOWARDS A COMMON DEFINITION OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA. AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAID THAT EASTERN OPPOSITION TO DISCUSSION OF DATA AT THIS STAGE REMAINED UNCHANGED. LATER, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES INFORMALLY INDICATED THAT THE EAST HAD HAD AUTHORIZATION SINCE THE PREVIOUS ROUND TO DISCUSS FORCE DEFINITIONS.

4. ONE POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THIS SUPERFICIALLY RATHER INCONSISTENT BEHAVIOR IS THAT THE EAST MAY HAVE EXPECTED THE WEST TO PUT FORWARD A PROPOSAL TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS DURING THE SPRING ROUND OF THE VIENNA TALKS AND THAT EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES MAY HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE END OF THE PREVIOUS ROUND TO DISCUSS BOTH DEFINITIONS AND DATA IF THE WEST MADE A MOVE TOWARDS INDICATING READINESS TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

5. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE POINTING IN THIS DIRECTION: IN THE FIFTH ROUND, SEVERAL EASTERN REPS HINTED THAT THE EAST WOULD CONSIDER DISCUSSING DATA IF THE WEST MOVED ON THE ISSUE OF INCLUDING NUCLEARS (MBFR VIENNA 0196). AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTH ROUND, EASTERN REPS REPEATEDLY ASKED WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WHETHER THE WEST WOULD MAKE A MOVE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THAT ROUND (MBFR VIENNA 0210,  
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SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00394 01 OF 03 231554Z

MBFR VIENNA A-17). IN RESPONSE, WESTERN REPS DISCLAIMED THAT THE WEST WAS PLANNING TO REDUCE NUCLEARS. IN THE WEEK OF JUNE 1, SOVIET REP KHLESTOV TOLD THE FRG REP THAT THE EAST WOULD DISCUSS DATA IF THE WEST INDICATED IT WAS READY TO REDUCE NUCLEARS, AND A GDR DELOFF MADE THE SAME POINT TO A US DELOFF (MBFR VIENNA A-100, A-102). THUS, IN THE FIRST PART OF THE ROUND, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES APPARENTLY WANTED TO TEST WHETHER THE WEST

PLANNED TO PUT FORWARD A NUCLEAR PROPOSAL IN THAT ROUND, DETERMINED FROM WESTERN REPLIES THAT THIS WAS MOST UNLIKELY, AND THEN MOVED TO PROPOSE DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS ONLY.

6. AMONG EASTERN MOTIVATIONS FOR THE EASTERN PROPOSAL THAT PARTICIPANTS AGREE ON A FORCE DEFINITION MAY BE (A) THE DESIRE TO BE SEEN TO BE TAKING THE INITIATIVE; (B) TO DEFLECT WESTERN PRESSURE FOR DATA DISCUSSION INTO A LESS DIFFICULT RELATED FIELD; AND (C) TO USE A DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS TO ADVANCE THE EASTERN AIM OF BRINGING ARMA-MENTS INTO THE SCOPE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THESE MOTIVATIONS DO NOT PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS DEFINITION TOOK THE FORM OF A PROPOSAL TO DIVIDE ALL THE FORCES IN THE AREA INTO TWO CATEGORIES, GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES.

7. KHESTOV MADE CLEAR IN DISCUSSING THE EASTERN DEFINITION THAT THE EAST HAD NOT CHANGED ITS POSITION THAT THERE MUST BE REDUCTIONS IN BOTH AIR FORCE PERSONNEL AND AIRCRAFT.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00394 02 OF 03 231641Z

45

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02

INR-07 IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0394

FROM US REP MBFR

8. IF THIS IS THE CASE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT ALL THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH, AS SET FORTH IN ARTICLE 3 OF THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 8, 1973, WOULD BE FOR EAST AND WEST TO AGREE ON THE MAJOR TYPES OF FORCES IN THE AREA SUCH AS, FOR EXAMPLE, ARTILLERY, TANK, FIGHTER/BOMBER AIRCRAFT, ETC., AND TO AGREE THAT THE LIST IS COMPREHENSIVE. EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS COULD THEN BE APPLIED TO EACH OF THESE CATEGORIES. THERE WOULD BE NO INTRINSIC NEED TO DIVIDE THESE FORCES INTO THE TWO LARGE CATEGORIES OF GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WOULD BE NO NEED TO CHARACTERIZE AIR DEFENSE UNITS AS EITHER GROUND OR AIR IN ORDER TO MATCH THEM WITH LIKE UNITS ON THE OTHER SIDE.

9. PRESENT WARSAW PACT ARMED FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00394 02 OF 03 231641Z

ARE BASICALLY DIVIDED INTO THREE FORCE CATEGORIES: GROUND FORCES, AIR FORCES, AND NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE, RATHER THAN NATO'S TWO FORCE CATEGORIES OF GROUND AND AIR. THIS IS AN ADDITIONAL REASON WHY THE EAST HAS NO APPARENT GROUNDS, GIVEN THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH, TO MOVE TOWARDS DIVIDING ALL THE FORCES IN THE AREA INTO TWO FORCES.

10. THE FACT THAT, NONETHELESS, THE EAST HAS PROPOSED THAT ALL FORCES IN THE AREA BE DIVIDED BETWEEN GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES THEREFORE MUST BE ASSESSED AS A MOVE ONTO THE CONCEPTUAL TERRAIN OF THE WESTERN APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS. WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE EASTERN OBJECTIVES IN THIS CONNECTION?

11. KHLESTOV HAS GIVEN TWO MAIN REASONS FOR THE EASTERN INITIATIVE TO USE THE TWO-FORCE CONCEPT IN MOVING TOWARDS AN AGREED DEFINITION. HE HAS CLAIMED THAT THE EAST WANTED TO DEMONSTRATE ITS WILLINGNESS TO MOVE TOWARDS THE WESTERN POSITION. HIS SECOND REASON WAS TO ASSURE THAT THE WEST DID NOT TAKE ALL REDUCTIONS IN GROUND FORCES, BUT ALSO TOOK SOME IN AIR FORCES. THE FIRST REASON IS UNCONVINCING AND THE SECOND IS NOT LOGICAL. IT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE PRESENT EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH TO SEEK THE WEST'S AGREEMENT TO REDUCE AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE OF EACH OF THE MAJOR TYPES OF FORCES IN THE AREA.

12. IN RESPONSE TO WESTERN QUESTIONS AS TO EASTERN MOTIVES, KHLESTOV HAS STATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE

FORCE DEFINITION PROPOSAL WAS INTENDED AS A "BRIDGE" TO PERMIT THE WEST TO CHANGE ITS DATA WITHOUT INCURRING PRESTIGE LOSS.

13. WHAT KHLESTOV APPEARS TO HAVE IN MIND, AMONG OTHER THINGS, IS TO OBTAIN WESTERN AGREEMENT TO A REVISED DEFINITION OF FORCES WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES AND CORRESPONDINGLY INCREASE

THE AIR FORCE DISPARITY. THAT SUCH A SHIFT OF DISPARITY IS ONE OF KHLESTOV'S OBJECTIVES IS EVIDENCED BY THE FACT THAT HE HAS ASSERTED THAT "IT WOULD NOT BE  
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SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00394 02 OF 03 231641Z

LOGICAL" TO PLACE ALL GROUND-BASED TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENSE (NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND) PERSONNEL IN THE GROUND FORCES. KHLESTOV HAS TAKEN THIS POSITION IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT HE CLEARLY STATED AT THE OUTSET OF THE DISCUSSION ON JULY 1 OF THE EASTERN FORCE DEFINITION PROPOSAL THAT IT WOULD NOT MATTER WHETHER SIMILAR FORCES WERE CHARACTERIZED UNDER AIR FORCES OR GROUND FORCES AS LONG AS THEY WERE PLACED TOGETHER IN ONE OF THESE TWO CATEGORIES. (FOR DATA BACKGROUND SEE PARAGRAPHS 7 AND 8 OF MBFR VIENNA 0368).

14. IT IS ALSO RELEVANT HERE THAT EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE SHOWN IN INFORMAL STATEMENTS DURING THE SIXTH ROUND THAT THEY CONTINUE TO EXPECT THE WEST TO MAKE A PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS IN REDUCTIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

15. ONE POSSIBLE CONCLUSION FROM THE FRAGMENTARY EVIDENCE REVIEWED ABOVE MIGHT BE AS FOLLOWS;

A. THE EAST IS PREPARING TO REACT TO A WESTERN OFFER OF NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS WHICH IT EXPECTS.

B. THE EAST WILL NOT REJECT THAT OFFER OUTRIGHT, BUT WILL NEGOTIATE ON IT. THIS IS SHOWN INTER ALIA BY DELIBERATE EASTERN EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS MADE IN MANY STATEMENTS AT A TIME WHEN THE EAST WAS APPARENTLY AWARE THAT THE WEST WAS PREPARING TO MAKE SUCH A PROPOSAL.

C. THE FORCE DEFINITION PROPOSED BY THE EAST, INCLUDING THE DIVISION OF FORCES INTO GROUND AND AIR FORCES, IS A PART OF EASTERN PREPARATION TO REACT TO A WESTERN PROPOSAL TO REDUCE NUCLEARS.

D. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE EAST MAY AGREE TO DISCUSS DATA FOLLOWING TABLING OF OPTION 3 IN VIENNA. IN ANY EVENT, THE EASTERN INITIATIVE TO DISCUSS DEFINITIONS

SHOULD BE REGARDED AS DELIBERATE PREPARATION ON THE PART  
OF THE EAST FOR EVENTUAL DISCUSSION OF DATA AT SOME  
LATER POINT.

16. THE EAST ALSO COULD BE MOVING TO PLACE ITSELF IN A  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00394 02 OF 03 231641Z

POSITION TO RESPOND TO THE SUBSTANCE OF A WESTERN NUCLEAR  
REDUCTION PROPOSAL.

A. THE EASTERN RESPONSE MIGHT BE ALONG THE LINES  
THAT THE EAST WOULD GIVE SOME CONSIDERATION TO A COMMON  
CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND WOULD AT THE SAME  
TIME BE WILLING TO DROP THE EASTERN REQUIREMENT THAT AIR  
FORCE MANPOWER BE REDUCED AND ACCEPT THE WESTERN PRO-  
POSAL THAT THERE BE A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON AIR  
FORCE MANPOWER.

B. THE EAST MIGHT ALSO STATE THAT THE WESTERN

SECRET

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00394 03 OF 03 231615Z

44

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02

INR-07 IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0394

FROM US REP MBFR

MOVE ON NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS HAD BEEN A SUFFICIENT MOVE  
IN THE CONTEXT OF "PRINCIPLES OF REDUCTIONS" TO PERMIT  
THE EAST TO AGREE TO DISCUSSION OF DATA, FOLLOWING AGREEMENT  
ON A FORCE DEFINITION, IF THE LATTER HAD NOT ALREADY  
BEEN AGREED.

C. THE EAST WOULD SAY THAT AN AGREED FORCE DEFINITION  
SHOULD PROVIDE FOR ASSIGNING ALL ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA  
EITHER TO GROUND OR AIR FORCES.

D. THE EAST MIGHT THEN TABLE EITHER ITS COMMENTS  
ON WESTERN DATA OR FORCE TOTALS OF ITS OWN.

-- IN DOING SO, IT WOULD INCLUDE THE POLISH  
AND CZECHOSLOVAK GROUND-BASED TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENSE  
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SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00394 03 OF 03 231615Z

(NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND) PERSONNEL IN THE AIR FORCE  
AND THE FRG PERSHING PERSONNEL IN THE GROUND FORCES.

-- THE EAST ALSO MIGHT ALLOCATE A LARGER  
PERCENTAGE OF SERVICE SUPPORT AND OTHER REAR ECHELON PER-  
SONNEL TO PACT AIR FORCE MANPOWER TOTALS THAN THE WEST  
IS CURRENTLY ESTIMATING IN ITS DIVISION OF PACT FORCES  
BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES.

-- THE EAST MIGHT SEEK TO CLAIM CREDIT FOR LOWER  
MANNING LEVELS IN WARSAW PACT UNITS THEN THE WEST HAS USED.

-- THE EAST MIGHT CLAIM THAT WESTERN ESTIMATES  
OF EASTERN FORCES INCLUDED SOME PERSONNEL NOT PART  
OF THE "ARMED FORCES."

-- THE EAST MIGHT ARGUE THAT WESTERN ESTIMATES  
OF WESTERN PERSONNEL FAILED TO INCLUDE SOME PER-  
SONNEL THAT WERE PART OF THE ARMED FORCES, I.E., THE GERMAN  
STANDBY RESERVE.

17. THROUGH TRANSACTIONS OF THIS TYPE, THE EAST MIGHT  
SEEK TO CONSIDERABLY REDUCE THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY  
AND HENCE, THE TOTAL REDUCTIONS IT WOULD HAVE TO TAKE IN ORDER  
TO REACH A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, AT THE  
SAME TIME PUSHING PART OF THE DISPARITY INTO AIR FORCE

MANPOWER, WHICH WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO THE PARITY PRINCIPLE ON THE BASIS OF PRESENT ALLIED PROPOSALS.

18. THE EAST WOULD POINT OUT THAT IT WAS RESPONDING TO OPTION 3 BY TWO MAJOR CONCESSIONS OF ITS OWN: IT WAS ACCEPTING THE WESTERN DEMAND FOR A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND DROPPING ITS OWN REQUIREMENT FOR REDUCTION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER.

19. IF THE WEST IN CONNECTION WITH OPTION 3 HAD ADVANCED THE IDEA OF EXTENDING THE COMMON CEILING TO COVER AIR FORCE MANPOWER, THE EAST MIGHT WELL STILL FOLLOW THE LINE DESCRIBED ABOVE AND WOULD CLAIM IN ADDITION THAT THE WEST WAS BOTH CHANGING AND INCREASING ITS DEMANDS ON THE EAST AND THAT THIS WAS UNFAIR.

20. THE EAST MIGHT ALSO WELL INSIST THAT, IF THERE WAS  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00394 03 OF 03 231615Z

TO BE A COMMON CEILING ON BOTH GROUND FORCE AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA, THEN THERE MUST BE OBLIGATORY AIR FORCE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS.

21. DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC ON JULY 22 WITH UK, NETHERLANDS, BELGIAN AND CANADIAN REPS INDICATED THAT THESE REPS SHARE THE GENERAL LINES OF THE ANALYSIS ABOVE. NONETHELESS, THE ANALYSIS IS OF COURSE ONLY SPECULATIVE. IT CONTINUES QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE EAST WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD BACK ON DATA AND THAT ITS RESPONSE TO OPTION 3 WILL BE NEGATIVE.

22. BUT IF IN RESPONSE TO OPTION 3 THE EAST DOES MOVE IN THE DIRECTION SKETCHED ABOVE, SUCH A MOVE WOULD MARK THE BEGINNING OF A PHASE OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REGARDED AS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD CAUSE NEGOTIATING PROBLEMS FOR THE WEST.

23. AS REGARDS THESE PROBLEMS, ONE CONCLUSION IS THAT, IF THE WEST IS GOING TO PUT FORWARD THE IDEA OF EXTENDING THE COMMON CEILING TO COVER AIR FORCE MANPOWER, ALTHOUGH WITHOUT REDUCTIONS IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER, THEN THIS ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN ALONG WITH PRESENTATION OF OPTION 3 AND NOT LATER.

24. SECOND, ONE INITIAL RESPONSE TO EASTERN EFFORTS TO CHANGE DATA BY DEFINITIONS WOULD BE TO INSIST ON DATA COMPARISON PRIOR TO ANY FINAL AGREEMENT ON FORCE CATEGORIZATION. RESOR

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